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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: An application of AcciMap to identify and analyse the causes
of the Eastern Star and Sewol Casualties

Degree: MSc
Thanks to the technological advances and strengthened system of global maritime
governance especially by IMO, occurrence of accidents in the maritime domain has
not increased with the continuing seaborne trade. However, potential risks on the ships
that were not under IMO regime should be concerned more seriously especially after
the two Asian casualties of Eastern Star and Sewol occurred in recent years.

The purpose of this research is to apply a recognized accident investigation method to
identify and analyse the causes of these tragedies and give some recommendations
based on the outcome of the research. After comparing with several popular
investigation methods, AcciMap was chosen as a harmonized approach to make the
research due to its advantages in organizational factors analysis and corresponding
recommendations exportation. The research contributes progresses in the application
of AcciMap in two significant events and provided some measures to prevent
repetitions of such disasters. However, further research is needed to further develop
the method due to the constraints in the approach itself but also due to weakness in
information collection and research limitations as well.

KEYWORDS: Organizational Factors, ActorMap, AcciMap, Eastern Star,
Sewol, Factual information, Identified Failures.
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1 Introduction
2.1 Background
It is well accepted that 90% of the global trade is carried out by the shipping industry (George,
2013). With the continued increase in population, the existing economy is keeping a growing trend
and resulting in a rise in the demand for seaborne trade. This trend is primarily driven by growth
and expansion in developing countries, leading to changes in trading patterns. (Figure 1)

Figure 1. World Economy and Seaborne Trade, 1985-2014(UNCTAD, 2015a; UNCTAD, 2015b)

On the other hand, continuing seaborne trade also means high potential maritime safety risks.
Among others, thanks to the technological advances and the strengthened system of global
maritime governance especially by IMO (Figure 2), marine casualties and incidents have not
increased with the improving contributions to the economy and have maintained at a stable level or
have even declined a little in recent years. (Figure 3)

1

Figure 2. Instruments over Time (IMO, 2016a)

IMO's main objective is to strengthen the system of global maritime legislation for all nations
involved in international shipping. As the only forum in which to develop global regulation that
can be uniformly applied, IMO developed an increasing number of instruments to assure the safe
and environmental navigation especially in recent years. Figure 2 illustrates the yearly and
cumulative number of different instruments from 1958 up to 2014. These instruments contributed
to maritime safety among the member states, official maritime industry associations and other
stakeholders.

2

Figure 3. Marine Casualties and Incidents (IMO, 2016b)
Admittedly, IMO instruments regulate international shipping and domestic ships do not
necessarily need to follow this regime, except national authorities and administration implement
those rules and regulations also to national domestic shipping. Different countries have found
different approaches to regulate the non-convention vessels. China, for example has made a great
contribution in its economic growth in recent years and waterborne trade has played a vital role in
improving national economy. Besides paying the attention towards the development of waterborne
transportation, China has also undertaken steps to enhance maritime safety by issuing regulations
on the safety management of inland waterways on the sidelines of IMO regulations. Training
mechanisms for mariners have been augmented by developed and applied new technologies in
domestic waters. Statistics for the most important inland river of Changjiang indicates steady
decline in marine casualties and incidents in recent years. (Figure4).
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Number of marine casualties and incidents in Changjiang 2010-2014
235
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168
125
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Figure 4. Number of marine casualties and incidents in Changjiang 2010-2014
Source: State of Administration of Work Safety

However, compared with the IMO regulatory framework vessels, the regulations for
non-convention ships are often not as elaborate and highly developed as the IMO general safety
and environmental protection regime. Potential risks are much higher due to the lower standards
and less qualified crew. Eastern Star accident was reflection of such standards that occurred on 01
June 2015 resulting in 442 deaths. Dramatically, a similar accident of the Sewol ferry took place
in Republic of Korea a year before the Eastern Star casualty. Ferry Sewol sank in the morning of
16 April 2014, on a route from Incheon to Jeju resulting in 304 deaths including passengers and
crew.

These accidents highlighted negligent behaviour of respective governments and administrations
and also frustrated the confidence of worldwide maritime safety. Thus, it is pertinent to identify
and analyze the causes, and especially the human factors leading to the two Asian casualties in
order to avert occurrence of such disasters along with improvement of maritime safety of
non-SOLAS ships in the future.
4

2.2 Literature review
As required by the Casualty Investigation Code (CIC) (IMO, 2008) and implemented by the
majority of States, the accident investigation, among numerous approaches to be applied to
improve safety performance on board, is one of several widely utilized approaches to achieve
safety (Harms-Ringdahl, 2004). According to Harms-Ringdahl’s argument, accident investigation
is the “collection and examination of facts related to an occurred specific event”. Along with this
useful and positive function, most major improvements or modifications to a maritime legislative
system, criticized as the “disaster-driven system”, are often carried out after lessons learned from
major accidents (Jalonen & Salmi, 2009). Additionally, in accordance with risk assessment,
analysis of an accident plays an indispensable role for setting priorities and identifying hazardous
sources (Svedung, 2000). However, most of the current maritime accident investigation systems
encourage investigators to determine what happened during an event and how the event occurred,
rather than why the event occurred (Lee N., Donald K, & Randal L, 2005). This is often coupled
with the lack of knowledge and appreciation for the organizational context in which human error is
made (Schröder, Baldauf & Ghirxi, 2009). To shun negative influence, a better understanding and
workable analysis causation model to direct accident investigation methodology is an alternative
need. (Kim, Nazir, & Øvergård, 2016)

Several authors (e.g., Reason, 1997; Rasmussen, 1997), while discussing the ‘‘safety space”, based
on their theories, have argued that socio-technical systems tend to drift toward states of higher risk.
The performance of the actors within a socio-technical system is always constrained by the
surroundings, e.g., administrative, competitiveness, economic benefits and safety related
constraints, thereby creating a small space of freedom for designers, operators, and managers to
perform their work tasks with little considerations given to the feasibility and consequences
(Rasmussen, 1997). Thus, accident analysis should incorporate the circumstances that induce
variation in behaviors as well as the dysfunctional interactions among correctly operating
components. Several accident analysis models e.g., Functional Resonance Analysis Method
(FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2012), Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1990; 1997; 2008), AcciMap
5

(Rasmussen, 1997), have been developed on the basis of the systems approach (Underwood and
Waterson, 2013).

Chinese scholars have researched on risk management, accident investigations, policies, and
suggestions and so on at the domestic level. They have tried to summarize some basic
characteristics of the risk management in water transportation through the statistics of accidents
that have happened in recent years (Li, 2007) and present an anticipation of accident (Chen,
2002). Some have focused on accident analysis in a certain areas, such as Shanghai (Zhang,
2013), Zhoushan (Xu, He&Lv, 2008), Xiamen (Wang, 2006) and Beihai (Long, 2012) and
provided some countermeasures to prevent risks from the view of legislation, the emergency
response system and infrastructure improvements. The risk management in Ro-Ro passenger
ships was also a popular researching aspect especially after the “11.24” 1 marine disaster of
China. (Zhang, 2010) Some others introduced updated regulations of the IMO and their effects
on Chinese passenger ships (Liu, 2010). Also researches related to the spot supervision
(Chen&Zhang, 2007), status analysis (Quan, 2010), safety management (Li&Jin, 2009) and
safety assessment (Hong&Yu, 2000) as well as safety management from governmental view (Liu,
2002) on Ro-Ro passenger ships. Research has been undertaken in the safety management of
passenger ships in domestic waters on the aspects of supervision on tour ships (Liu, 2015),
human factors (Zhang, 2001), technological analysis (Zhang, 2014), small ships management (Ji,
2015) and so on. Relevant research on maritime management from the public’s service view
(GAO, 2011), construction of the maritime wet (Han, 2011) and maritime management (Yu,
2008) were also considered by scholars.
Post Sewol accident, few Chinese scholars carried out researches on the accident and provided
recommendations. Cause analysis on the Sewol was discussed in various articles (Wu, 2014) and
(Li & Wu, 2014), which was also made in 2015 (Mi &Zhao, 2015). Further discussions about

1

The Ro-Ro passenger ship “ Dashun”, owned by Yantai Ferry Company of the Shandong Province, capsized on 24 November
1999 while navigating around the sea areas of Yantai (a city of Shandong Province) leading to fatal consequences with 280
deaths and an economic loss of 90 million RMB.
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human factors in the accident (Guo, 2014), influence to the maritime safety regime of the
Republic of Korea, search & rescue (Xu, 2015), legal view (Wang, 2015) and references for
China government from the accident (Wang, 2015) were developed by Chinese scholars.

Despite of above research and discussions, the underlying causes of the Eastern Star needs to be
identified and analysed in order to acquaint with the situation and issues of Chinese maritime
safety management in inland waterways by using a schematic approach. In addition, it is also
imperative to compare the Sewol and Eastern Star accidents to learn more from these tragedies
and avoid the occurrence of similar accidents in the future.

2.3 Objectives of the study
This study attempts to achieve the following objectives:
(1) Analysis of the maritime safety situation of the inland waterways of China.
(2) Providing detailed narratives of the Eastern Star and Sewol accidents in detail.
(3) Explaining how AcciMap can contribute to identification of causes and its application in
analysing failures of the two Asian accidents.
(4) Comparing similarities and differences in the two Asian casualties.
(5) Providing recommendations in the maritime safety management for non-SOLAS
passenger ships especially for the Chinese government’s reference.

2.4 Limitations of the study
There are two main limitations to this study. The first concerns the materials sources. It is
difficult to make an objective evaluation about the two casualties due to the limited information
achieved from investigation reports. The Eastern Star accident occurred in the year 2015 and
therefore a very scarce academic analysis is available for reference. Secondly, numerous
departments were involved in the casualty making it more multifaceted. It is difficult to give a
complete and accurate description of the relationship. A detailed investigation report for accident
of ferry Sewol was published but in local language and English version available from English
7

website was limited. Hence, it poses a great challenge to make an accurate evaluation when
depending on second-hand data and materials.

The second limitation lies in the approach itself. It is critical to choose a suitable model to
analyse the causes since every model has its advantages and disadvantages. Though AcciMap has
the advantage in most aspects concerning this study, however, disadvantage exists in terms of the
quality of the analysis. Analysis depends on the quality of accident reports that is subjective
since AcciMap analysis does not provide a method to develop corrective measures.

2.5 Study Plan
This dissertation is mainly divided into seven main chapters. The first chapter begins with a
preliminary explanatory background of the topic giving the motivation and objectives for the
research. Factual information of the two Asian casualties of Eastern Star and Sewol is described
separately in Chapter Two. Chapter Three introduces the methodology of AcciMap used in this
study. The application of AcciMap in the two casualties of Eastern Star in China and Sewol in
the Republic of Korea is illustrated in Chapter Four. Chapter Five involves comparison of the
two Asian accidents. Chapter Six elaborates about findings and further discussions. The
concluding parts are placed in Chapter Seven followed by recommendations on non-SOLAS
ships risk management for the reference by governments in the future.

8

2 Factual information of the two Asian casualties
2.1 Factual information of the Eastern Star Casualty in China
2.1.1Casualty brief
At 21:30 on June 1, 2015, the Eastern Star Cruise, owned by the Chongqing Oriental Steamship
Company enroute from Nanjing to Chongqing encountered a severe thunderstorm and capsized
in short span of time while navigating in the middle of the Yangtze River in the Jianli waters of
China. On 13 June, a total of 442 deaths were confirmed and only 12 persons were rescued. It
was the deadliest peacetime maritime disaster in China's history and the worst since
the Taiping steamer sinking in 1949, which killed over 1,500 persons.

The Eastern Star was a river cruise ship operating in the Three Gorges region of inland China,
constructed in February 1994 and retrofitted in 1997, 2008 and 2015. The inclement weather was
cited as primary reason by the investigation report issued at the end of year 2015.
2.1.2 Particulars of the ship
Table 1. Particulars of the Eastern star ship
Name of ship

Dongfangzhixing,
Translated as Eastern Star

Type

Cruise ship

Length

76.5m

Beam

14m

Extreme Vessel Breath

12.4m

Height

18.6m

Depth

3.1m

Draught

2.5m

Load Draught

2.16m
9

Tonnage

2200

Full load displacement

890.602

Rated Power

441.00kw ×2

Capacity

534

Capacity of Crew

50

Registered owner

Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation

Manager

Same with the owner

The Eastern Star was a pointed stern steel ship with double bottoms (See picture 5) and was first
built in 1994 by the Chuandong shipyard. When departing from Nanjing port, the ship was
equipped with an AIS (B), a GPS, a tester, 2 navigation radar, a ECS and 3 searchlights as well
as 2 VHF radiotelephones, 2 portable VHF radiotelephones and a set of external PA.

Figure 5. The full image of Eastern Star
Source: Wikipedia
2.1.3 Ship certifications
After investigation, the certificates of the Eastern Star were deemed complete and valid. The
10

certifications held are listed as follows:


Certificate of nationality of the ship,



Ship minimum safe manning certificate,



Inland vessels airworthiness certificate,



Rivers and Three Gorges ship sailing certificate,



Inland vessels Sewage Pollution Prevention Certificate,



Inland Ship Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate,



Inland Tonnage certificate,



Inland load line certificate,



Inland passenger ship certificate,



Document of Compliance (copy),



Safety Management Certificate.

2.1.4 History of the voyage
The cruise Eastern star departed from the eastern city of Nanjing and was sailing to Chongqing
in the southwest via the Three Gorges - a journey of approximately 1,500km (930 miles). The
Eastern Star departed Wumadu pier of Nanjing Port on 28 May 2015 at 1300 hours and sailed
upstream in the Yangzi River. Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) to the destination Chongqing
Port was at 0630 hours on 07 June 2015. The status of the Eastern Star during sailing is listed as
follows.


Crew: 46,



Passengers: 398,



Fuel oil: 30 tons,



Fresh water: 17 tons,



Ballast water: 3 tons,



Forward & aft draught: 2.10 meters, even keel.
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Table 2. Logbook of the Eastern Star
Time

Event

2103

Navigated to the water area around “No.1 Buoy of Tianzi”. Ship speed 14 km/h.
Lighting and drizzling.

2121

Maximum wind speed 24.6 m/s (Bf 10). Low visibility. Captain ordered to Chief
Officer (C/O) to slow down speed, altered small rudder angle to port, and intended
to anchor in the water area near the starboard side of the river. Ship speed 12.0
km/h.

2123

Ship speed 2.2km/h, and gradually reduced to 0.

2124

Ship started to go astern due to the influence of strong wind. Ship speed 4.0 km/h
astern.

2125

Ship speed 5.6km/h astern. Captain ordered C/O to increase the engine speed.

2126

Ship speed reduced to 5.0 km/h astern. Suddenly encountered downburst storm, the
maximum wind speed increased to 32-38m/s (Bf 12-13).

2129

Ship speed reduced to 4.0 km/h astern by the effects of the engine and rudder.

2130

Ship started to turn and wind angle increased under the effect of the strong storm.
The ship was not under control. Ship speed increased to 6 km/h astern. Later on, the
ship suddenly listed to starboard and started to flood.

2131

Main engine stopped. Heavily listed to starboard.

2132

The Eastern Star Capsized. AIS and GPS signals disappeared.
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Figure 6. The sinking timeline of Eastern star
Source: Chinese Ministry of Transport satellite data
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2.1.5 Environmental conditions
A squall line system appeared "above the waters where Eastern Star" navigated accompanied by
a downburst, tornadoes, other short-term local heavy rainfall as well as severe convective
weather at the time of accident and therefore the ferry capsized suffering strong storms.

The hydrology report indicated that no shallow patches, obstacles, Malaysia Island riverbed
morphology were found and the Shoal pattern was basically stable with a smooth flow.
2.1.6 Search and Rescue (SAR)
SAR operations were launched immediately for saving passengers and crew. The operations
reached full scale about twelve hours after the accident. SAR operations were observed from
highest echelons in the Government directly from Communist Party General Secretary Xi
Jinping and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Rescue efforts were overseen personally by Premier Li
Keqiang, Vice Premier Ma Kai and State Councillor Yang Jing. 82 people were confirmed dead
by 04 June, with few bodies washed ashore 50 km (31 mi) downstream from the wreck. Ship’s
captain and engineer were rescued along with 12 people in the immediate aftermath.
2.1.7 Summary
On 01 June 2015, at 21:30 Beijing Time, the passenger cruise Eastern Star capsized immediately
after encountering a severe thunderstorm when navigating in the Jianli waters of Yangtze River
of China. 442 deaths were confirmed in the disaster. According to the investigation report,
inclement weather was the main cause of the casualty. However, 45 persons who came from 12
departments were punished due to their liabilities.

2.2 Factual information of the Sewol Casualty in the Republic of Korea
2.2.1 Casualty brief
The sinking of the ferry Sewol occurred in the early hours of 16 April 2014, enroute from
Incheon to Jeju in the Republic of Korea. Ferry had embarked 476 passengers that included
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mostly students from secondary school, Danwon High School (Ansan City). Distress signal was
passed by vessel at 0858 hours (Korea Standard Time) from a range of 2.7 km (1.7 nm) north of
Byeongpungdo. 172 people were rescued during SAR efforts and fishing boats and other
commercial vessels rescued more than half of them. The Republic of Korean Coast Guard
vessels arrived on scene approximately 40 minutes after the accident. In all, 304 passengers and
crewmembers lost their lives in the disaster.
2.2.2 Particulars of the ship
Table 3. Particulars of the Sewol
Name of ship

MV Sewol

Type

RoRo passenger ferry

Builder

Hayashikane Dockyard Co., Ltd, Japan

Year

1994

Class

Korean Register of shipping (since 2012)

Port of registry

Incheon, the Republic of Korea (since 2012)

Gross tonnage

6825 GT

Length over all

145.61m

Beam

22.00m

Depth

6.25m

Load Draught

2.16m

Maximum speed

22kn

Capacity

956 persons (921 passengers +35 crew), 180 vehicles and
154 regular cargo containers.

The Sewol was a Ro-Ro ferry built by the Japanese company Hayashikane Shipbuilding &
Engineering Co. Ltd. in 1994. The ferry was capable of carrying 956 people onboard including
crew. It had a legal carrying capacity for 180 vehicles and 154 regular cargo containers. The
maximum designed speed of the ship was 22 knots (41km/h; 25mph). The ship formerly
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belonged to Japan Oshima Transport Co., Ltd. (headquartered in Kagoshima Prefecture).
Chonghaejin Marine purchased the ferry in 2012. It was renamed as Motor Vessel (MV) Sewol
that was 18 years old and dilapidated. Initially it was named as Ferry Naminoue and was
operated as a transport ship for cargo and passengers by the Japanese company A-Line Ferry
from 1994 to 2012. Thereafter it was registered by Chonghaejin and underwent modifications
from 12 October 2012 to February 12, 2013. These modifications were later found to be based on
an illegal redesign of the ship.

Figure 7.The image of Sewol ferry
Source: Korea Register of shipping, Yonhap
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2.2.3 Sinking description
Table 4. Sewol sinking description
Time

Event

0800

The 25-year-old third mate, Park Han-gyeol, began her scheduled four-hour shift on
the bridge.

08:48

Right before 8:48 a.m., Cho steered the ship on a course of 135 degrees,
or southeast. At 8:48, Third Mate Park, who was monitoring the radar and radio in
the ship, came to conclusion that there was another ship approaching on a collision
course and therefore ordered to Helmsman Cho to turn the ship, initially by 5 degrees
to 140 degrees and then to 145 degrees. Cho reacted to Park's orders and turned to
starboard to 145 degrees.
The second turn to course 145 (10 degrees) in one second, from 8:49:12 to 8:49:13, is
contemplated to be sharp in the context that generally large passenger ships would
take two minutes to make a five-degree turn. When the chief engineer was enquired
about the situation, Cho replied that the "steering gear was not working." Due to the
imbalance, Park ordered Cho to balance the ship to "Port," but this order was
misheard as a Korean word meaning to 'turn in the opposite direction,' a mishearing
that did not affect the meaning. The chief engineer testified that the ship commenced
tilting precisely after Park's last order.

0849

0850

The chief engineer ordered an evacuation of the engine room through a call to the
assistant engineer. With the engines off, Sewol became unable to change directions
and began drifting sideways.

0852

Choi Duk-ha, a Danwon high school student aboard the ferry at 8:52 a.m., made the
first emergency call; he called the national emergency service number and reported to
the Jeollanam-do fire station that Sewol was capsizing.

0855

At 8:55 a.m., Sewol's crew made their first distress call to the Jeju vessel traffic
service requesting them to notify the Coast Guard since the ferry was rolling and in
danger.

0930

Around 9:30 a.m., the captain ordered to abandon the ship, though the order may not
have been relayed to all the passengers.

1118

At 1118 hours approximately, the bow of the ship was submerged, with a section of
the hull about 2 meters (6 ft. 7 in) high and 20 to 30 meters (66 to 98 ft.) long showing
above the water.
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Figure. 8 The route of Sewol ferry (Source: Wikipedia)
2.2.4 Captain, crew and passengers
The crew made seven phone calls with staff from Chonghaejin Marine. The passengers were
instructed to stay in their cabins while the captain and crewmembers abandoned the ship. The
captain, chief engineer and the chief and second mate were the first one to be rescued. The
captain was rescued at approximately 0946 hours. As the ship capsized, some passengers
followed the announcements to stay put, even as the water came in. Most of the student
passengers obeyed the announcements. Some passengers who climbed to the top of the ship or
jumped into the water were rescued. Videos recorded by passengers during the capsizing were
recovered. The recordings included announcements instructing passengers to stay in place and
put on life jackets, while some videos showed passengers joking around, putting on life jackets
and bidding farewell.
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Passengers made calls, sent text messages and KakaoTalk mobile messages during the capsizing
of ferry. The last message was sent at 1017 hours. Text messages and social media posts
allegedly made by survivors after the capsizing were circulated in the media, but an investigation
by the Cyber Terror Response Centre found that passengers did not use their phones between
1200 hours on 16 April and 1000 hours on 17 April. All the reported survivors' messages were
termed to be fake.
2.2.5 Search and Rescue
The SAR activities are extracted from the accident investigation report and summarized in the
Table 5 (see next page).
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Table 5. The SAR activities for Sewol
Time (Korea Standard Time)
8:58

SAR activities
Sewol started to flood and sinking. Korea coast guard (KCG)
receive information from one student’s parent

9:00

Sewol sent out the SOS alarm, KCG sent out rescue team

9:30-9:40

Ship from KCG arrive the site of accident following by
helicopter. Some commercial ships joined the SAR.
Sewol capsized and sinking, 90% of the ship was flooded.

10:00-10:20

About 120 passengers were rescued

10:55

Korea Navy sent out about 20 ships and one helicopter to

16th of April

rescue.
Korea Air force sent out 46 lifeboats by transport aircraft.
11:00

Sewol almost sank into water totally.

14:00

Professional rescue people arrived.
USA Navy arrived; however, the rescue was interrupted due to

15:00
the bad weather and lack of lighting at night.
17:00

16 helicopters and 24 ships joint the SAR. Fishing vessels in
the vicinity also joint.

20:00
17th of April

Underwater SAR was interrupted due to the bad weather.
Flare burst was used by KCG to restart underwater SAR.
Ship and helicopters from Navy arrived.
Divers cannot enter into ship as the low visibility underwater.
280 passengers still missing.

18th of April

The bow of the Sewol sank into the water.
Divers successfully entered into ship.

19th of April

3 dead bodies were rescued at the first attempt of entering into
the ship

The Korea government and civil groups conducted the following SAR activities.
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2.2.6 Summary of the Sewol accident
On 16 April 2014, the Sewol capsized and sank 1.5 kilometres (0.93 mi) off Donggeochado,
and the south Jeolla Province. Sewol was on the passage from Incheon to Jeju. A total of 304
people were killed in the accident.

The Government's Board of Audit and Inspection of the Republic of Korea revealed that Korean
Register's licensing was based on falsified documents. The amount of cargo carried was twice as
the legal limit. Investigation into accident revealed that the ship was carrying 124 cars, 56 trucks,
and 1157 tons of cargo.

2.3 Conclusions derived from of the two accidents
From the factual information, except for the bad weather, illegal modifications on the ship,
loopholes in the management regime of the ship company and the inadequate surveillance from all
levels of administrations were the main contributing factors to the Eastern Star accident.
Coincidently, the Eastern Star and the Sewol accidents had some major common aspects. They
both occurred on domestic ships and resulted in tremendous number of deaths. Both ships caught
in the accidents were initially constructed in 1994 and were retrofitted several times. The
long-time of sea service and illegal modifications of the two ships, combining with unfavourable
external factors, caused the tragedies.
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3 Methodology of the study
3.1 Background
Derived from UNCLOS, there are a number of IMO conventions requiring administrations to
investigate any casualty that ships flying their flag. Among others, there are the SOLAS
regulations I/21, MARPOL and Load Lines Conventions, warranting investigations to provide
the findings from those investigations to the organisation. The new Code of International
Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or
Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code) was adapted at the 84th session of the MSC in
May 2008 and entered into force on January 2010. The basic idea of Code is to identify the
necessary changes of existing rules and regulations that are supporting a repetition of an accident
that resulted in the death, damage to the marine environment and/or total loss of a ship. Accident
investigations and the improvement of rules and regulations are expected to contribute to
changes in systems and processes to bring them up to a higher safety level. Same principles
should be applied to the ships not governed by IMO rules concerning safe navigation and
protection of marine environment in domestic waters.

It entirely depends on investigators how they investigate any marine accident, since there are a
variety of different and maybe even competing investigation methods. It seems to be worth to
research if the use of a harmonized approach to accident investigations can improve the safety
and efficiency of maritime transportation. Existing approaches to accident investigations are
typically based on models – as e.g. sequential like fault trees or models that consider the
organizational context like Reason. These models are linear and have been found not to be
sufficient enough and result in system approaches. The recently developed and introduced
AcciMap method is somewhere between a linear organizational model and a system approach. In
this chapter studies will be carried out in order to find out about the advantages, potentials but
also shortcomings and or lack of AcciMap approach to meet the aims declared by IMO. These
investigation methods can also be made applicable in analysing accidents in domestic waters.
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Based on Rasmussen’s risk management framework, AcciMap (Rasmussen 1997) is a
systems-based accident analysis method used to graphically depict the decisions, actions and
failures that contributed to the accident under analysis, along with the relationships between
them. AcciMap considers failures by operators on the front line and also failures at the higher
company management, local authority and governmental levels.

Another graphical method, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is used to graphically depict the failures
involved in accident scenarios. Using tree-like diagrams, failure events are described along with
their human – and hardware – related causes.

Inspired by Reason’s Swiss cheese model, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS; Wiegmann and Shappell 2003) is a systems-based accident analysis method,
originally developed for aviation accident analysis purposes but since applied in a range of
domains, that provides analysts with taxonomies of failure modes across four organisational
levels (unsafe acts; preconditions for unsafe acts; unsafe supervision; and organisational
influences). Working backward from the immediate causal factors, analysts classify the errors
and associated causal factors involved across the four levels using the taxonomies provided.

Viewing accidents as a control problem, Leveson’s STAMP model (Leveson 2004) focuses on
control failures across the overall work system. STAMP considers various forms of control,
including managerial, organisational, physical, operational and manufacturing-based controls
and provides analysts with taxonomy of control failures (Leveson 2009). STAMP also uses
systems dynamics to investigate the causes of the control failures identified.

Social Network Analysis (SNA; Driskell and Mullen 2004) is used to understand network
structures via description, visualisation and statistical modelling (Van Duijn and Vermunt 2006).
When used for accident analysis purposes SNA is used to evaluate the communications failures
23

involved or problems within the social network (e.g. overloaded nodes or communications
bottlenecks). SNA produces social network diagrams, which depict the connections between
entities during scenarios of interest. Statistical modelling is then used to analyse the networks
mathematically in order to quantify aspects of interest.

The propositional network methodology was originally developed for modelling situation
awareness in complex socio-technical systems (Salmon et al. 2009) and has since been used to
model the situation awareness-related failures involved in accidents (e.g. Griffin et al. 2010).
Networks representing situation awareness are constructed and situation awareness failures (e.g.
lack of awareness, erroneous awareness and failure to communicate key information) are
identified through network analysis procedures.

Critical Path Analysis (CPA; Baber 2004) is used to model the performance time associated with
sequences of tasks and has previously been used to model operator response times during
accident scenarios (e.g. Stanton and Baber 2008). CPA works by modelling task sequences and
calculating, using standard human response time data and the time required for completion of
different sequences of tasks.

The Technique for the Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors (Tracer;
Shorrock and Kirwan 2002) is both an error prediction and retrospective error analysis method
having previously been used for the analysis of air traffic control and rail accidents. Tracer uses
six error taxonomies to investigate the operator errors involved, including the errors themselves,
performance shaping factors, error detection and recovery strategies.

Unlike the individual methods described above, the Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork
framework (EAST; Stanton et al. 2005) is an integrated suite of methods used to analyse activity
in collaborative systems. EAST uses a combination of methods to describe the task, social and
knowledge networks underlying collaborative activity, including task analysis, social network
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analysis, network analysis and teamwork assessment methods. Recent applications (e.g. Rafferty
et al, In Press) have involved using the approach to model accident scenarios.

As listed above, there are a variety of different investigation methods like FTA, HFACS and
STAMP and they take the advantages in the accident investigations for some cases. After
comparing with the features of these methods, AcciMap is a harmonized approach to analyse the
organizational factors and is the most applicable one for this research in the causes identification
and recommendations suggestion.

3.2 AcciMap and its features
The AcciMap method (Rasmussen, 1997; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) is an accident analysis
technique based upon the notion that there are multiple levels of causality involved in accidents,
as put forward in Rasmussen’s (1997) model of risk management. The method presents a
graphical portrayal of factors within the system that impact the occurrence of an accident.
Typically, the following six levels of complex socio-technical systems are considered (although
these can be modified to suit analysis needs): government policy and budgeting; regulatory
bodies and associations; local area government planning and budgeting (including company
management); technical and operational management; physical processes and actor activities;
and equipment and surroundings. Levels 1–4 represent all of the decision-makers that may have
been involved in the accident scenario, described by levels 5 and 6, through the decisions they
make in their normal work context (Woo and Vicente, 2003). AcciMap analysis focuses upon the
causal relationships between these levels that allows for a vertical analysis across the levels of a
system rather than the horizontal generalisation within individual levels normally found in
accident analysis methods (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002).

A generalization aggregating accidental courses of the events set is represented by a
cause-consequence chart. Predictive risk analyses are widely based on these charts (Leveson
1995). The choice of the critical event reflecting the release of a well-defined source of hazard
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for example “loss of control of accumulated energy” or “loss of containment of hazardous
substance”, defines the choice of set to include in a cause-consequent chart. The causal tree
(among potential causes, the logic relation) is connected by the critical event with a consequent
event tree (the possible temporal and functional relation among events) clearly reflecting the
switching of the flow as a result of automatic safety systems or human decisions (Rasmussen &
Svedung 2000). Controlling the hazardous process at the socio-technical system’s lowest level is
this analysis’ focus, as shown in the figure below (Qureshi, n.d.)

Figure 9. The socio-technical system involved in risk management
(Rasmussen, 1997) Source: (Sklet, 2002)
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Each method has its own advantages and disadvantages in analysing the cases of accident.
AcciMap shows the causal relations obtained between different technical, psychological,
organisational, cultural, regulatory, legal and other factors, each of which domains typically have
their own methods of explanation (for example, psychology does not follow physical laws;
organisational behaviour is explained using largely different concepts from those of individual
psychology and regulatory principles are often different from all of those). As one graphic
method, AcciMap has been very effective in creating an overview of complex occurrences and
for the communication of assumptions and findings within a risk analysis and design team.
Moreover, AcciMap serves to identify relevant decision-makers and the normal work situation in
which they influence and condition possible accidents. The focus is not the traditional search for
“management errors” and the like. Therefore, the AcciMap representing the conditioning system
of one particular accident is well suited as a “conversation piece” to support discussion with the
relevant decision-makers. The basic AcciMap represents the conditioning system and the flow of
events from one particular accident. Suggestion of improvements by changes identified from this
map will therefore very likely be ad hoc. A generalization is necessary based on a set of accident
scenarios.

As every coin has two sides, the features of AcciMap can be illustrated as follows from its
strengths and limitations.

Strengths:
(1) An AcciMap is intuitively easy to understand. It is based on a sound theoretical model
and is simple to learn and use.
(2) An AcciMap representation requires the analyst to consider all factors in various levels in
the organizational model and explicitly to check to see what the causal relations between
any factors in different levels of the model might be. Causal connections are thus
observed which might be missed if the domains in the organizational model are
considered separately.
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(3) AcciMap enables identification of system-wide errors leading to the occurrence of the
accident at the sharp end. The complete accident aetiology is exposed.
(4) Its output offers an exhaustive analysis of accidents and incidents.
(5) It provides a clear visual interpretation of the accident aetiology.
(6) It is a generic approach that has been applied across many domains.
(7) Considering the different levels involved in the accident, it enables an extended timeline
of causality to be established.
(8) It focuses on systematic improvements rather than focusing on blaming individuals.
(Salmon, 2011)

Limitations:
(1) The counterfactual condition used to determine causality is informal; it is not provided
with formal semantics. Thus, it is dependent on the intuition and personal judgement of
the investigator.
(2) There is no criterion to determine whether an organizational model is adequate; the
model comes from outside the analysis.
(3) The level of generality of the factors expressed in the nodes is high; they can be very
abstract. An attempt to derive countermeasures is correspondingly vague.
(4) The AcciMap method provides only a weak analytical approach to physical failures or
identifying inappropriate features of the physical part of the system.
(5) An AcciMap does not represent the results of a causal analysis by itself. It requires a
textual expression of the results and serves to illustrate or summarise that text.
(6) The result of an AcciMap analysis is relatively lightly constrained; it is thus possible to
derive different AcciMap of the same incident showing different sets of causes,
depending on the analyst's focus. (Salmon, 2011)

3.3 Summary
AcciMap is one of the major graphic methods in accident analysis, although it has several
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limitations. AcciMap requires as many factors as the analyst can consider so that the causal
connections are observed in a simple and clear way. It will serve to identify the decision-makers
having a potential for improving safety and to support communication with the various
disciplines relevant for cross-disciplinary cooperation in research and design. Compared with
other models, AcciMap has the advantage in the organizational factors analysis and also is easy
to understand.
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4 Application case studies
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in above chapters, AcciMap is a method somewhere between a linear
organizational model and a system approach, which takes advantage of organizational factors in
accident investigation. Though the accidents did not happen on the ships under IMO’s regime,
the approach itself should, nevertheless, be effective. In this research, organizational factors in
the Eastern Star and Sewol accidents will be identified and analysed carefully in order to identify
weaknesses in domestic marine safety management. After a comparison of accident analysis
methods, AcciMap was chosen for application to the two accidents for its strengths in serving the
research purpose.

In order to explain the AcciMap and test its application to the accidents, several workshops were
organized during this research. On June 8, the first workshop focusing on the AcciMap and its
possible application to the Eastern Star casualty was held in WMU. Two Professors and two
researchers from the MARISA Group and three students participated in the seminar. After an
introduction to the AcciMap and a brief description of the Eastern Star casualty, the possible
factors contributing to the casualty were listed according to the scheme of the AcciMap. And the
relationship among the different departments was clarified. The seminar lasted two and half
hours and an AcciMap of the Eastern Star incident was draft based on the investigation report.

To identify the actors involved in the Eastern Star incident more exactly, and based on the results
of the first workshop, a second workshop was held on June 13 in WMU. A professor and a
researcher from the MARISA Group and two students participated in the workshop. After
confirmation from

Chinese students with the investigation report, an ActorMap was drafted

and the relationship of these actors was clarified. In addition, a micro ActorMap of the shipping
company was created at the same time.
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4.2 An ActorMap of Eastern Star
After the preparation work, an ActorMap will be constructed first. The ActorMap is a graph
identifying the various organizational bodies contributing to the landscape in which accidents
flow and defining the relationship among actors. Due to the complexity, this representation tends
to be hierarchically, ordered in a number of levels:


Government,



Regulatory bodies & Associations,



Regional & Local government,



Company.

The organizations involved in an accident can be listed according to the levels, and relevant
relationships will be clearly described in a graph. In this way, the ActorMap can help provide an
understanding of the organizational context.
4.2.1Liable departments according to the investigation report
Table 6. Departments and people were punished for Eastern Star accident
Name of department

Number of people to be punished

Ship company

9

Yueyang (a city of Hunan Province) MSA

3

Wanzhou (a district of Chongqing City) Maritime division

4

Wushan (a district of Chongqing City) Maritime division

1

Chaotianmen (a district of Chongqing City) Maritime division

1

Chongqing (Provincial rank city) MSA

3

Changjiang MSA

4

Changjiang River Administration of Navigational Affairs

3

Wanzhou Navigational Affairs Administration

10

Wanzhou SASAC

3

31

Wanzhou Transport Committee

1

Wanzhou district government

3

Altogether

45

From the Table 6, Wanzhou Navigational Affairs Administration and the shipping company take
the main liability. Local administrations take full liability according to the governmental system in
China. However, the central government takes responsibility for surveillance.

4.2.2 Constructing an ActorMap of Eastern Star
For the case of the Eastern Star, according to the investigation report, actors can be identified as
in the map shown in Figure 10.
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System Level

State Coucil
1.Government
policy
MOT
Ministry of Transport

2.Regulatory
bodies and
associations

China MSA

Changjiang River
Administration of
Navigation Affairs

Changjiang MSA

3.Local area
government

Chongqing MSA

Yueyang MSA

MIIT
Ministry of Industry
and Information
Technology

Chongqing Government

CCS
China Classification
Society

Chongqing
Transport
Commission

Wanzhou District
Government

Chongqing SASAC

CCS
Chongqing Branch

Chongqing
Navigational affairs
Administration

Wanzhou Transport
Commission

Wanzhou SASAC

Wanzhou
Navigational affairs
Administration

CCS
Wanzhou Branch

Wanzhou Maritime
Division

Chongqing
Eastern Shipping
Coorporation

4.Company
management

Figure 10. ActorMap of Eastern Star casualty
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CMA
China
Meteorological
Administration

4.2.3 Identify Actors and their responsibilities in Eastern Star
According to the above map and table, both central and local governments as well as some
organizations are involved in the accident. The departments are introduced as follows and some
important departments’ responsibilities are listed in Tables 7-10.

At the government level, the Ministry of Transport (MOT), the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology (MIIT) and China Meteorological Administration (CMA) under the
State Council were involved in the accident according to the investigation report. Apart from the
above organizations listed in the tables, China Meteorological Administration (CMA) is
responsible for providing the weather forecast information and the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology (MIIT) is in charge of the standards of ship design and construction
related to the Eastern Star.

At the Regulatory bodies & Associations level, China Classification Society (CCS), China
Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), Chongqing municipal government and Changjiang
River Administration of Navigational Affairs were involved in the accident.

At the Regional & Local government level, Changjiang MSA, Chongqing Transport Commission
and SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) of Wanzhou
District, Chongqing were involved in the accident.

Changjiang MSA is in charge of the MSA Branch, VTS and SAR. Chongqing Transport
Commission is in charge of local Navigational Affairs Administration, including shipping
administration and ship inspection. SASAC of Wanzhou District is in charge of the Chongqing
Eastern Shipping Corporation.
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Table 7. The Ministry of Transport
Name of organization

Ministry of Transport (MOT)

Location

No.11 Jianguomennei Avenue, Beijing, China

Main duties

As a component department of the State Council, MOT,
reconstructed

in

2008,

is

responsible

roads , highways ,shipping , ports ,

for railways,

urban

passenger

transport, civil aviation and so on.
Institutional settings

17 internal organs (General Office, Comprehensive
planning Department, Water Board, SAR Centre…); 2
agencies (Yangtze River Shipping Authority and Zhujiang
Authority); 7 institutions (China MSA, CCS, Rescue and
Salvage Bureau, DMU…) directly under MOT

Table 8. China Maritime Safety Administration
Name of organization

China Maritime Safety Administration (China MSA)
Also called Maritime Bureau of MOT in China

Location

No.11 Jianguomennei Avenue& No.18 Anhuaxili, Beijing,
China

Main responsibilities

Responsible for the exercise of national water safety
supervision and the prevention of pollution from ships,
vessels

and

marine

facilities,

maritime

security

management and administrative law enforcement, crew
administration, fulfilling maritime safety management
functions of MOT; also responsible for investigating the
shipwreck.
Institutional settings

20 internal divisions (Navigation management, ship
inspection

management,

crew

management,

security

management service, maritime security administration, tube
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fouling at risk…); 14 branches under China MSA
(Heilongjiang MSA, Changjiang MSA…); 27 provinces,
autonomous

regions

and

municipalities

(excluding

Heilongjiang Province, Guangdong Province, Guangxi
Zhuang

Autonomous

Region,

Hainan

Province)

and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps have local
maritime bureaus. Local maritime bureaus can be classified
into provincial, municipal and county levels belonging to
local governments. China MSA only gives them some
technological direction.

Table 9.
Name of organization

Changjiang River Administration of Navigational Affairs
Changjiang River Administration of Navigational Affairs of
MOT (Also translated as Yangtze River Shipping Authority
and abbreviated as “Changjiang Shipping”)

Location

Wuhan, China

Main duties

Authorized

by

MOT

to

take

the

administrative

responsibility for the Yangtze River (Yunnan water Fu Shanghai Yangtze River estuary, trunk waterways 2838
km). In detail as follows:
1.The drafting of the Yangtze River shipping regulations
2.Organize the preparation of the Yangtze River shipping
plan and supervise its implementation
3.Yangtze River shipping, port and shipping facilities
administration and industrial management
4.Quality of passenger and freight transport on the Yangtze
River, port and shipping facilities engineering quality
supervision and management
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5.Yangtze River water safety oversight and shipping Police
Work
6.Coordination of 13 provinces related with Yangtze River
Institutional settings

11 internal divisions (Transport management, safety
administration, waterway and navigation administration…);
8 institutions (Changjiang MSA, Changjiang Waterway
Bureau, Changjiang Three Gorges Navigation Authority…)
directly under Changjiang Shipping

Table 10. China Classification Society
Name of organization

China Classification Society (CCS)

Location

Headquarters located in Beijing, China

Number of Staff

CCS has about 4,100 employees and has established over
80 offices both at home and abroad, forming a global
service network.

Main responsibilities

Founded in 1956, China Classification Society (CCS) is the
specialized

organization

in

China

that

provides

classification services. CCS aims to provide services for
shipping, shipbuilding, offshore exploration and related
manufacturing
furnishing

industries

reliable

and

marine

classification

insurance

requirements

by
and

providing independent, impartial and integral classification
and statutory services to ships and offshore installations, for
the promotion and safeguarding of the safety of life and
property at sea and for the prevention of pollution to the
marine environment.
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4.2.4 Shipping Company
At the company level, Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation takes direct responsibility for
the incident. In detail, the Technical & SMS Department, HR, the Transport Department and the
company-owned shipyard took the liability for the incident. (See Figure 11)

Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation

Company
management

Physical processes
& activities

Safety & Technical
department

HR

SMS Division

Master

Ship maintence

C/O

Safety Training

Helmsman

Shipyard

Transport Department

Ship construction and
conversion

Figure 11. ActorMap of Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation

In detail, from the information listed above, some important questions during the ship
construction and safety management can be identified as follows:
(1) The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) is responsible for the general
principles and rules for construction of domestic ships.
(2) Chongqing Navigational Affairs Administration and its Wanzhou branch (including ship
survey bureau) are in charge of the granting permit, supervision and survey of ship
construction.
(3) The ship design institutes would check the ship’s technical information and the Chongqing
Navigational Affairs Administration and its Wanzhou branch (including ship survey bureau)
would double check and approve the ship construction plans. Then, the shipyard of
Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation is in charge of the several conversions of the
Eastern star.
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(4) Generally, CCS and its local branches check the stability of ship. Wanzhou Navigational
Affairs Administration inspected the stability of the Eastern Star.
(5) Changjiang River Administration of Navigation Affairs is in charge of issuing water transport
permits to the Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation.
(6) Changjiang MSA, Chongqing MSA and Wanzhou MSA should be responsible for issuing the
safety management system from the ISM code to the Chongqing Eastern Shipping
Corporation and monitoring the safety performance of ships through periodical inspection.
Besides, Changjiang MSA should also be responsible for supervising and monitoring ship
navigational safety in the Changjiang River by VTS and other related methods.
(7) Wanzhou State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration (Wanzhou SAASC) is directly
in charge of the Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation and supervises the safety
performance of the shipping company.

4.2.5 Summary
In China, MOT takes overall responsibility for water transport and China MSA takes
responsibility for maritime safety administration on behalf of MOT. Considering the importance
of the Yangtze River, authorized by MOT, Changjiang Shipping takes administrative
responsibility for the Yangtze River covered trunk waterways of 2838 km and coordinates
relevant affairs of 13 provinces. CCS, an institution of MOT, provides services for shipping,
shipbuilding, offshore exploration and related manufacturing industries and marine insurance,
including drafting the standards for shipping inspection.

At the regional level, the local MSA belongs to its territorial government and receives
technological direction from MOT’s representative as China MSA and Changjiang Shipping.

In the Eastern Star case, two component departments of the State Council were involved in the
weather forecasting responsibility of the CMA and standards of ship design and construction
responsibility of the MIIT.
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At the company level, Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation belongs to Wanzhou SASAC;
therefore, SASAC of Wanzhou should be responsible for administrative lapses related to the
accident.

4.3 An AcciMap of Eastern Star
4.3.1 Drawing an AcciMap
The AcciMap (Rasmussen 1997; Svedung and Rasmussen 2002) is an accident analysis method
that is used to graphically represent the system-wide causal failures involved in accidents, as
well as identifying the environmental conditions and physical processes involved. It also focuses
on the causal flow of events upstream from the accident, looking at the planning, management
and regulatory bodies that may have contributed in some way (Svedung and Rasmussen 2002).
Typically, the following six levels of complex socio-technical systems are considered (although
these can be modified to suit analysis needs): topography and configuration of scenery and
equipment, accidental flow of events and acts, technical and operational management involved,
company management and local area planning, regulatory bodies and associations and
government policy and legislation.

Combining the information above with the investigation report, an AcciMap of Eastern Star can
be drafted as in Figure 12:
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Figure 12. AcciMap of the Eastern Star casualty
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4.3.2 Explanations
Accidental flow of events and acts First, the accident flow of Eastern Star can be outlined with a
series of events and acts as level 5 with red arrows. The ship encountered severe weather, which
led to an unsuccessful attempt to maintain maneuverability. It capsized into the river
immediately and passengers on board had difficulty escaping from the ship. No distress call was
sent out. The tragedy caused a total of 442 deaths with only 12 persons surviving.

Topography and configuration of scenery and equipment At the time of the accident, a squall
line system appeared above the waters where the Eastern Star navigated, accompanied with
downburst, tornadoes, and other short-term local heavy rainfall, as well as severe convective
weather. Waters where the ferry capsized suffered strong storms with the maximum wind speed
reaching 32-38m/s (Bf 12-13). The unanticipated tornadoes directly caused the capsizing.
The extreme weather conditions encountered by the Eastern Star resulted in the loss of stability.
After the initial construction of the ship, it underwent rehabilitation and technical changes on
three occasions and the fundamental stability criterion numeral of wind pressure was gradually
reduced (see Table 11). Although it is still in line with regulatory requirements, the ship will
capsize when encountering 21.5 m/s beam wind (BF 9) or 32.0 m/s maximum instantaneous
wind speed (BF 11) with 21.1°~156.6° wind angle according to calculation and experience. The
navigational area for the Eastern Star is approved as level B, which means it will lose stability
when subjected to 21.52 m / s (Bf 9). However, at the time of the accident, the wind reached Bf
12.
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Table 11. Changes of the stability criterion 1
Years

1994

1997

2008

2015

Ship stability (weather) criteria (K)

1.355

1.09

1.018

1.014

Some equipment on the Eastern Star was also problematic. The watertight doors in the engine
area were left open and beds in the cabins were not well fixed. Additionally, the accident
happened at night when most people were asleep in their cabins and the rapid development with
capsizing made the time for escaping extremely limited.
The captain and crew did not send out any SAR alarm. It was the rescued passengers and a
passing ship that alerted the SAR authorities. It also took a long time to report to central SAR
services due to the complicated procedures.
Technical and operational management involved At the technical and operational level, the
company manipulated ballast water tanks during the conversion in 2015 and did not report the
change to authorities. This conversion impaired the stability of the ship. Automatic closing
devices were not fitted to watertight doors and were not noticed during daily checks. The ship
was not well maintained and potential risks were not controlled in advance.
The passengers were organized by a small travel agency in Shanghai named after “Red Sunset
Group” that was designed for retirees and offered a discounted price in non-peak time. Most of
the passengers were over 60 years old. The accident happened at about 21:30 when most of the
passengers were asleep in their cabins due to their habits and the heavy shower. The limitation of
their mobility and the short response time made it impossible to escape. Most of the passengers
were not aware of what was happening outside when they lost their lives by drowning with the
capsizing of the ship.

1

The stability criterion, which usually is expressed by the letter K, is one of the important and basic requirements for ship
stability. It is stipulated that the stability of the ship under the various loading conditions calculated shall be in accordance with
the following inequality formula of K>1.
K =lhmin/lw, lhmin means the minimum heeling lever, lw means the wind heeling lever
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Company management and local area planning At the company management level, Chongqing
Eastern Shipping Corporation took direct responsibility for the accident. The problematic
management regime and implementation of regulations in Chongqing Eastern Shipping
Corporation was exposed following this accident. Some ships with similar routes changed their
schedules according to the weather forecast and avoided the dangers. However, the Eastern Star
was already delayed according to the tourist plan in the first two days and was told to regain lost
time to maintain the original schedule, so it continued navigation under the dangerous weather
conditions.

The company adjusted the ballast tanks without applying inspections from local professional
institutions. The captain and senior officers on board had not received adequate training,
especially for response to extreme weather conditions. When the accident happened, the captain
did not recognize the potential risks caused by the severe weather. He did not send out a distress
message or sound an alarm to the whole ship. The captain and crew did not organize any kind of
evacuation from the ship. The newly hired crew members were not qualified for their positions
due to inadequate training and careless assessment. The daily security checks were not thorough
enough to identify problems such as lack of closing appliances to prevent water ingress and
unfixed beds in cabins. In addition, there were no full-time staffs in charge of ship daily
maintenance. The monitoring systems were not under dynamic tracking and the VTS operators
were not following the development.

Regulatory bodies and associations At the Regulatory bodies & Associations level, Changjiang
River Administration of Navigational Affairs had not effectively implemented the shipping
administrative department duties and issued waterway transport licenses without careful survey.
Changjiang MSA did not audit the safety management system of the company strictly and failed
to identify regulatory loopholes. The crew training was not supervised effectively. The
problematic modifications, including ballast water tank adjustments and narrowing of escape
routes, were not noticed. The lack of closing devices required by regulations was not detected
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during inspections. Yueyang MSA did not implement the requirements from MOT and
Changjiang MSA to maintain tracking and monitoring of every passenger ship navigating in
Changjiang. The operational limits at wind force BF 9 were not safe enough considering the poor
condition of some old ships.

The surveillance system of relevant local administrations did not play a full role in safety
management on ships. Local ship inspection departments like Chongqing Navigational Affairs
Administration (Chongqing Inspection Bureau is included) and Wanzhou District Navigational
Affairs Administration (Wanzhou Ship Inspection Bureau is included) did not make a serious
inspection on Eastern Star after it was reconstructed and did not find the problems of its illegal
adjustment of ballast tanks and poor equipment in cabins. The certificates were issued without
serious surveys and inspections. The crew training and assessment was not under effective
supervision. The higher levels of administration like the Chongqing Transport Commission also
did not conduct an effective surveillance for all of these potential safety risks.

As the lead department of Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation, Wanzhou District SASAC
did not carry out strict safety supervision and inspection of the company and did not find the
fraud in training and assessment or the unhealthy management regime of the company.

Government Policy and Legislation The wind force was unforeseen and not forecasted by
meteorological departments due to their current technological capabilities. No dynamic ship
survey system was available to authorities to monitor the conversions of ships. Necessary
equipment under IMO regime, such as GMDSS, was not mandatory on domestic ships in China.

As central government bodies, the Ministry of Transport (MOT) and the Ministry of Industry
and Information Technology (MIIT) have the responsibility to set relevant policies, standards
and regulations but they are not empowered to punish the entities for their faults. Sometimes
they can advocate and require the local departments and companies to follow the safety
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regulations by issuing provisions. But they cannot control the actual results.

4.3.3 Summary
The analysis found a number of key failures, all of which contributed to the Eastern Star Casualty.
These failures were related to the equipment, the characteristics of the passengers, loopholes in the
management regime of the company and the defective surveillance from all levels of
administration. These causes have been analyzed with the framework of the AcciMap at the six
levels and have also been catalogued into several aspects that relate to recommendations in the
following chapters.

4.4 An ActorMap of Sewol
4.4.1Constructing an ActorMap of Sewol
According to the investigation report into the Sewol accident, an ActorMap is drafted as shown
in Figure 13.
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System Level

Ministry of Oceans
and Fisheries(MOF)

1.Government
policy

2.Regulatory
bodies and
associations

3.Local area
government

Shipping and logistic
bureau

Maritime Affairs and
safety policy Bureau

Jeju local office

Jeju
VTS

4.Company
management

Mokpo Coast Guard

Korea Coast Guard

Jeju Coast Guard

Jindo
VTS

Chonghaejin Marine
Company Ltd.

Figure 13 ActorMap of the Sewol casualty
47

Korea shipping
association

Korea Register of
Shipping

4.4.2 Identify Actors and their responsibilities in Sewol
At the government policy level, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) takes full
responsibility for maritime safety in the Republic of Korea.

At the time of the Sewol accident, three departments, the Shipping and Logistic Bureau, the
Maritime Affairs and Safety Policy Bureau and Korean Coastguard, were under MOF and carried
out some administrative responsibilities on behalf of MOF, according to national laws and
regulations. They are at the regulatory bodies and associations level. Besides these three
departments, Korea Shipping Association and Korea Register of Shipping acted as technical
associations and conducted surveys and related technical tasks authorized by MOF.

At the local area government level, Jeju local office, Mokpo Coast Guard and Jeju Coast Guard
were in charge of local maritime safety and the local VTS of Jeju and Jindo.

At the company management level, Sewol belonged to Chonghaejin Marine Company Ltd., major
shareholders of which are Haiti (39.4%), Kim Han-sik (11.6%), and I.ONE.I (7.1%). The company
was actually controlled by Yoo Byung-Eun who was the president of SaeMo Group.
4.4.3 Summary
As the highest authority, MOF takes responsibility for defining the national maritime safety
system for domestic passenger ships in the form of policies and regulations. Under its leadership,
the Shipping and Logistic Bureau, the Maritime Affairs and Safety Policy Bureau and the Korean
Coastguard have operational responsibility and supervise associations like the Shipping
Association and Korea Register of Shipping on behalf of MOF. There are some branches and
sub-branches carrying out similar responsibilities in the local domain.
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4.5 An AcciMap of Sewol
4.5.1Drawing an AcciMap
Similar to the Eastern Star, after actors were identified, the Sewol AcciMap can be draw as
shown in Figure 14 with cause identification and analysis.
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Figure 14 AcciMap of the Sewol casualty
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4.5.2 Explanations
Accidental flow of events and acts Firstly, the Accident flow of Sewol can be concluded in a
series of events as shown by the line with red arrows. The accident occurred at 20km north of
Screen Island, Ronan County, where the natural conditions are complicated. The inexperienced
helmsman felt the rudder angle was significantly larger than normal steering and was
unsuccessful in the attempt to maintain maneuverability. The large rudder angle made the ship list
heavily and the ship capsized in the near coastal sea. The inadequate awareness of risk of the
passengers, the improper actions of the captain and the delay in SAR increased the loss of lives
to 304 in the end.

Topography and configuration of scenery and equipment The submarine topography where the
accident occurred is rather complicated with a number of underwater obstructions. It is difficult
for the ship to navigate under the influence of wind, stream, wave, surge, and fog. The complex
environment also brought out problems for rescue. The waters where the accident occurred were
about 30-meter deep with a 0.5 m wave height and 11.7 degrees Celsius water temperature. The
visibility was only 20 cm for SAR and the flow rate reached 8 km / h.

The crew did not close the watertight doors according to the regulations. The ship listed
dangerously in one direction, resulting in flooding in watertight compartments. Flooding could
have been avoided if internal watertight devices had been in place. The staff’s negligence sped
up the capsizing.

Vehicles on board were not well fastened. When different kinds of vehicles were loaded, they
should have been fastened to prevent displacement during transportation. When the accident
occurred, 180 cars, 22 trucks and 34 sets of trucks over 2.5t were not effectively fastened with a
chain or rope, resulting in heavy movement.
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Technical and operational management involved A malfunction in the rudder equipment was
identified in the investigation report. The materials for rudder maintenance applied by Sewol
were aging due to their long existence. The problematic rudder device caused a significant error
when steering. The ship continued rotating until the rudder reached the maximum steering angle
so that the ship was out of control. When navigating in the complicated waters, the young
helmsman operated the ship improperly with a sharp turn from 135 to 150 degrees. The Sewol
began to list to port and tilted towards the water while the captain was not on the bridge. The
overall effect was that the ship turned about 45 degrees to the right and rotated 22 degrees on the
spot for a span of 20 seconds. The cargo fell to one side of the ship causing the Sewol to lose all
of its restoring force and allowing water to flow into the ship through the side door of the
cargo-loading bay and the car entrance located at the stern.

Excessive and problematic modifications were made to the Sewol. At the time of its purchase by
Chonghaejin Marine on 2012, the ship that would come to be known as the Motor Vessel (MV)
Sewol was 18 years old and dilapidated. It was first named Ferry Naminoue and was operated
from 1994 to 2012 as a transport ship for cargo and passengers by the Japanese company A-Line
Ferry. After it was purchased on 8 October 2012, the vessel was registered by Chonghaejin on 22
October 2012 and underwent modifications from 12 October 2012 to February 12, 2013. The
modifications were based on an illegal redesign of the ship. After the modifications, which
included the addition of extra passenger cabins on the third, fourth, and fifth decks, Sewol's
passenger capacity was increased from 804 to 956, including the crew, 180 vehicles, and 154
regular cargo containers. The vessel weighed a total of 6,825 tons, and had 46 rubber lifeboats,
each with a capacity of 45. It could travel at a maximum of 22 knots (41km/h; 25mph) and its
weight was increased by 187 tons. The modifications resulted in the ship’s center of gravity
being moved upward by 0.51m (1ft. 8in) as well as a left-right imbalance.

The ship was seriously overloaded. According to the documents quoted by the Associated Press,
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during the total 394 voyages between Incheon and Jeju after modifications, the overloading
times reached as many as 246 and among them there were 136 times of loading cargo over
2,000t and 13 times of more than 3,000t. On April 16, when the accident occurred, Sewol carried
more than 400 passengers, 180 cars, 22 trucks and 34 sets of trucks over 2.5t, with a total weight
of 3,608t, which was 3.66 times the full load.

This was almost the worst overloading on record.

It was easy to capsize in such an overloaded condition, especially when encountering bad
weather like wind, rain, snow, or fog.

Interestingly, the Sewol was equipped with enough advanced escaping facilities,

but only two

among 44 lifeboats were opened and 4 escape ships, which can accommodate over a thousand of
persons, were not opened at all in the accident. When in a state of emergency, the captain did not
make an effective response. Since the captain misjudged the dangerous situation and lack of
capability to deal with emergencies, he failed to organize the crew to take timely measures to
help the passengers, including guiding the passengers to evacuate immediately to the place
where the lifeboats and life rafts were placed. Even when Jindo control center told the captain to
direct the passengers to wear lifejackets as soon as possible for emergency evacuation and escape,
the crew did not completely fulfill the corresponding duties. It is the captain and crew’s weak
risk knowledge and skills that resulted in missing the best time for escaping.

Company management and local area planning The Sewol did not follow the course suggested
by MOF and navigated a course with many shoals, reefs, islands and other obstacles. Stranding,
grounding and other accidents often occurred in those areas. The accident happened in an area with
many obstacles and the helmsman had planned to escape from the dense obstacles and steered
sharply, which resulted in the accident.

Main passengers on the Sewol were juveniles who had lack of sense of crisis and were not
trained to cope with the dangerous situation on board. Video records illustrated that some
students kept playing even when the broadcast required them to don lifejackets. Since it was time
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for breakfast, many passengers were trapped in the downstairs shops, restaurants and
entertainment venues, which were difficult to escape. When sinking into the water, they could only
survive a short time due to the cold water and scarce air.

Jindo Traffic Control Centre (VTS) staff did not follow the provisions to maintain monitoring,
made false exchange records and attempted to delete the electronic surveillance files when
investigated by prosecutors.

The Captain and crew did not take responsibility in the emergency. The inexperienced helmsman
was incapable of controlling the ship by herself especially in a complicated situation while the
captain left her alone. The captain even abandoned the ship, leaving most of the passengers still
in danger. Neither the captain nor crew received adequate training especially in the knowledge
and capability to cope with emergency situations.

Regulatory bodies and associations From October 2012 to February 2013, the Sewol was
subjected to a 5-month testing period by the South Korean Register of Shipping, after which the
Register approved the modifications made. However, the Register decreased the authorized cargo
capacity by half to 987 tons and required 2,000 tons of water to serve as ballast in order to
provide balance. The upward stability was not seen as a potential risk when the Sewol was
registered.

The Government's Audit and Inspection Board later revealed that the Register's licensing was
based on falsified documents. Prosecutors later estimated that 1,077 tons of cargo was
permissible and that 1,695 tons of ballast was necessary to carry 1,077 tons of cargo. The
overload problem was very serious in the SEWOL and happened quite frequently in past voyages.
However,

it failed to draw enough attention and was not punished by relevant organizations.

STCW regulates that the duties on a ship arranged by captains should be suitable for safe
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navigation. Obviously, the captain of the Sewol did not make a reasonable duty arrangement. In
addition, the captain should help everyone on board to escape and is bound to be the last person
to leave the ship in distress, according to international practice. In this case, the captain was
among the first group of people rescued, while most passengers were still in the capsizing ship.
Compared with international conventions, the requirements and training for captains and crew of
domestic ships are neither mandatory nor adequate.

Government Policy and Legislation After the incident, the Korean navy, fire department, police,
and coastguard dispatched a total of 16 helicopters and 24 ships to carry out the emergency rescue,
and offshore fishing vessels in the vicinity also were involved in the rescue work. The Ministry of
Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea even collected volunteers from around the country
who could dive to join the SAR task. American Richard amphibious assault ship (USS Bonhomme
Richard (LHD 6)) and synergistic ship-borne helicopters were involved in the rescue. However,
SAR process did not have a successful result for the reasons of delayed emergency response,
confused disaster information report, poor coordination with the victims and inadequate scientific
and technological support.

4.5.3 Summary
The failures identified and analyzed in the Sewol accident, with the help of AcciMap, include
complicated navigation environment factors, responsibilities of captain and crew, the
profit-oriented shipping company without basic safety concerns and inadequate governance.
Similar to the Eastern Star accident, AcciMap is also helpful in providing recommendations that
will be discussed in the following chapters.
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5 Comparison of the two accidents
Coincidently, the two Asian accidents, Eastern Star and Sewol, have some major points in
common. Both ships involved in the accidents were initially built in 1994 and were retrofitted
several times. IMO conventions were not applicable to these ships since both were involved in
domestic shipping. These accidents resulted in considerable loss of lives and had similar safety
management issues. A comparison of the accidents will assist in carrying out safety assessment of
the risks in domestic shipping in China and the Republic of Korea. Risk mitigation options may
allow application of IMO conventions in the national domain for amelioration of safe and
environmentally friendly shipping. Respective administrations should pay more attention to these
comparisons to avoid repetition of such accidents.

Combined with the above content of this study, a comparison will be made at two levels of factual
information and identified failures by AcciMap.
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5.1Comparison of factual information
Table 12. Factual information comparison between Eastern Star and Sewol
Information

Eastern Star

Sewol

Ship type

Cruise ship

Ro-Ro passenger/cargo ship

Capacity

534 passengers and 50 crew

921 passengers, 35 crew, 180 vehicles and 154 regular cargo
containers

Built and
modifications
Persons/cargos on

Initial build in 1994 and retrofitted in 1997, 2008 Initial build in 1994 and retrofitted in 2013
and 2015
398 passengers and 46 crew

446 passenger and 30 crew, 185 vehicles, 150 containers and 1157

board during accident
Ship company

tons of cargo
Chongqing

Eastern

Shipping

Corporation, Sewol

belonged

to

Chonghaejin

Marine

company;

major

invested and administrated by Wanzhou District shareholders were Haiti (39.4%), Kim Han-sik (11.6%), I.ONE.I
SASAC of Chongqing

(7.1%). It was actually controlled by Yoo Byung-Eun, President of
SaeMo Group.

Accident area

Yangtze River of China

Donggeochado of the Republic of Korea
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Accident time
Passengers on board

At 21:30 on June 1, 2015

On the morning of 16 April, 2014

Most of the passengers were over 60 years old Main passengers in Sewol were students from Danwon High
from a tourist group named Red Sunset.

Sinking time

School.

The accident occurred due to inclement weather The ship sank after more than 3 hours post capsizing.
and lead to capsizing followed by sinking in 2
minutes.

5.2Comparison of identified failures
Table 13. Identified failures comparison between Eastern Star and Sewol
Identified failures

Eastern Star

Sewol

Accidental flow of

The ship encountered severe weather, causing unsuccessful The inexperienced helmsman observed that the rudder

events and acts

attempt to maintain maneuverability. It capsized into the angle was significantly larger than normal steering, which
river immediately and passengers on board had difficulty to led to a loss of maneuverability. Excessive list was
escaping from the ship and no distress message was passed. resultant from the large rudder angle, causing the ship to
capsize in coastal sea.

Topography and

At the time of accident, a squall line system appeared The accident occurred in a narrow channel with torrential
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configuration of
scenery

above

the

accompanied

waters
with

where

Eastern

downburst,

Star

tornadoes

navigated, water but not at its peak time.
and

other

short-term local heavy rainfall coupled with severe
convective weather. Waters where the ferry capsized
suffered strong storms with the wind speed-reaching
maximum to 32-38m/s (Bf 12-13).
Equipment

The watertight doors in engine area were left open and The watertight doors were left open.
Vehicles on board were not well fastened.

beds in cabin were secured seaman like.
Technical and
operational
management

The company manipulated ballast water tanks during the The rudder equipment malfunction was discovered in the
conversion in 2015 and did not report to authorities. This investigation report.
conversion impaired the stability of the ship.

The excessive and problematic modifications resulted in its

Automatic closing devices were not fitted to watertight centre of gravity being shifted upward by 0.51m (1ft. 8in)
doors and were not noticed during the daily checks. The as well as a left-right imbalance.
ship was not well maintained and potential risks were not The ship was seriously overloaded.
controlled ahead.

Effective response was missing from Captain during the
emergency.
Escape routes were adequate and different facilities for
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escape existed, but were not used capably.
Company management

The Eastern Star was directed to compensate for the time

Sewol did not follow the course as suggested by MOF and

lost previously by keeping the original schedule leading to

navigated close to many shoals, reefs, islands and other

continuation of navigating in dangerous weather

dangers around.

conditions.

The inexperienced helmsman was incapable to control the

The company manipulated the ballast tanks without

ship by herself especially in a complicated situation in the

inspections from local professional institutions.

absence of captain. The captain and other crewmembers

The captain and senior officers onboard were not trained

abandoned the ship leaving most of passengers to their fate.

adequately especially for the response to extreme weather
conditions.
Local area planning

Most of the passengers were over 60 years old and the Main passengers in Sewol were juveniles lacking sense of
accident happened at their sleeping time. The limitation of crisis and were not trained to cope up with dangerous
their mobility and the short response time made it situations onboard.
impossible to escape.

Jindo Traffic Control Centre (VTS) staff failed to monitor

The monitoring systems were not under dynamic tracking continuously followed by falsifying records and tried to
and

the

VTS

operators

were

not

following

development.

the deleting electronic surveillance files while prosecution was
in progress.
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Regulatory bodies and
associations

The authorities issued the waterway transport licenses The Republic of Korea government's Audit and Inspection
without careful survey.

Board later revealed that the Register's licensing was based

The safety management system of the company and crew on falsified documents.
training were not supervised effectively.

The upward stability was not looked as a potential risk

The problematic modifications were not noticed.

when the Sewol was registered.

The missing closing devices required by regulations were The overload problem was very serious in SEWOL and it
not found out during inspections.

happened quite a number of occasions in the past voyages

The surveillance system of relevant local administrations but went unnoticed and therefore was not punished by
did not play a full role in safety management on ships.
Government policy and The wind force was accidental and not forecasted by
legislation

relevant organizations.
The process of SAR was not a successful one from the result

meteorological departments due to the current

for the reasons of lag emergency response, confused disaster

technological capabilities.

information report, poor coordination with the victims and

No dynamic ship survey system was existed to monitor the

inadequate scientific and technology support.

modifications carried out for the ships by any of the
authorities. Necessary equipment like GMDSS under IMO
regime was not mandatory on domestic ships in China.
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5.3 Summary
Similarities and differences can easily be concluded from the above tables. As far as the factual
information is concerned, both accidents caused a huge loss of life, while the time and weather
conditions were quite different, leading to the great difference in number of survivors. The weather
conditions that the Eastern Star encountered were extremely severe and peculiar, and the Sewol
was reported to start sailing in foggy conditions and suffered from the complicated topography.
The natural situation directly caused or catalysed the accidents. However, the accidents could have
been avoided if the companies had carried out the safety management regulations and stopped the
navigations in time.

Similar enforcement, regulatory, management and training gaps can be found from the comparison.
The modifications impaired the stabilities and the situation went unnoticed and uncorrected by
authorities. Maintenance and daily safety checks were not adequate and some problematic
equipment was not detected. Training programs such as contingency planning and emergency
preparedness for captain and crew were inadequate. Generally, the regulations on the domestic
ships both in China and the Republic of Korea were not as strict as that on ships under IMO
regime.

In the Eastern Star case, the unsuitable procedures sometimes constrained the results of
surveillance and disciplinary action to the problematic companies could not be taken in time.

In the Sewol case, there were some unsuitable procedures in SAR, which were not organized
effectively and efficiently to enable a fast response in rescuing and saving more lives.
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6 Discussions and findings
6.1 Contributions of AcciMap
The analysis of the tragic capsizing of Eastern Star and Sewol was approached from the
multi-layered diagrams by examining weaknesses in the safety control structure. The approach of
AcciMap has served three main aims of the paper:
 Identification of the actors involved in the accidents and relationship among them for
further deliberation of the failures.
 Illustrated questions according to the layers in AcciMap and uncovered the rationale
behind the decisions made leading to such a high number of fatalities.
 Formulated safety recommendations by classifying the causes associated with different
problems and developing relevant compensation in the future.

As Leveson (2011) pointed out, if the purpose of accident analyses is to find the ‘‘root cause” or
someone to blame, we might lose the sight to seek potential opportunities to maximize what can be
learned from the accident.

The Eastern Star accident happened in extreme weather conditions that led to the huge loss of life.
Through post analysis using AcciMap, human factors can be identified clearly. The ship’s
company undertook modifications without approval from the local inspection department and the
lead department also failed to check the same. The training imparted to captain and crew was
inadequate and they were, therefore, unable to cope up with the complicated situation while
navigating in such harsh weather conditions. The safety equipment was not checked prior to
sailing or during rounds.

The rudder command – regardless of whether it was a flawed human decision or a technical error,
should not be addressed as a primary explanation for the Sewol accident. The financial incentives
and cost-cutting efforts of ship-owners led the vessel to an alarming high-risk state, making it more
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vulnerable to accidents. Government regulatory agencies and industry associations failed to
enforce proper constraints. Moreover, effective feedback channels to report safety critical
information to authorities were not established. The activities carried out on board were not
monitored in respect to correctness. Thus, the improperly designed vessel safety control structure
with unbalanced responsibility created an unacceptably hazardous condition. Authorised
personnel responsible for taking decisions regarding vessel conversion design, approval, cargo
arrangement, crew management, vessel operation and inspection w ere either ignored or unaware
of the negative impact of their decisions on other parts in the safety systems (Kim, Nazir, &
Øvergård, 2016).

The AcciMap provided the logical levels for causal factors and connections analysis. It enables the
compilation of large amounts of information regarding different causes of accidents, the area of the
socio-technical system in which each factor arose and precisely how the factors came together to
produce the accident, within a single coherent diagram. The approach promoted a systematic view
of accident causation and focused on repairing system deficiencies to mitigate future accidents
rather than reprimanding the individual involved and leaving the deficiencies that promoted their
actions unaddressed. In addition, it assisted in safety recommendation development relating to the
high levels regarding legislation, regulations, certification, auditing and government decisions.

6.2 Constraints and future improvements
Constraints were experienced in collecting evidence. Maximum information was retrieved from
the investigation reports in local languages. Inappropriate understanding due to local language and
translation may impair the accurate analysis. The causes identified from the investigation report
could not be completed and well fitted in the AcciMap levels. Due to the complicated
administrative procedures both in China and the Republic of Korea, the liabilities are not easy to
be concluded at higher levels. The quality of the analysis produced by AcciMap entirely depends
upon the quality of the input data used. Accurate and comprehensive data is not always available
as much of the investigation may be based on assumptions, domain knowledge and expertise. The
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output does not explicitly generate remedial measures or countermeasures and these are based
entirely on analyst judgment, leading to reduce the reliability.

For example, in the Sewol case, few components were indeed operated ‘reliably’ in terms of
making decisions (e.g., KR) based on their context and information they possessed. However, poor
coordination and communication, and dysfunctional interaction among the components of the total
safety system played a critical role in leading to the dangers involved and escalation to an accident.
Obviously, many of these systemic casual factors are only indirectly related to the immediate
events and conditions (Kim, Nazir, & Øvergård, 2016).

It is very difficult to ease the burden of the affected people whose lives have been changed post
accident. However, the Eastern Star and Sewol tragedies impart an important lesson for the
passenger transport industry. They highlight the need for taking a system approach to the detection
and prevention of breaches of safety constraints and calls for curative actions at both national and
international level. Only then can we supersede the quick fixes of symptoms provided by
individual components of the system and get to the true cure.

In the future, other socio-technical methods for accident investigation are suggested to be applied
in such casualty analysis and, hence, may lead to more beneficial results.
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7 Recommendations and conclusions
7.1 Recommendations
The AcciMap not only analyses the route causes of the accident, but can also assist in concluding
recommendations by classifying the causes. At least 8 aspects regarding enforcement gaps,
regulatory gaps, unsuitable procedures, company negligence, training and qualifications, and
license and market pressures have been identified and recommendations will be illustrated in Table
14 and Table 15.

Generally, in the Eastern Star case, from strategic design, policies should put safety management
in domestic waters at an equal level to international areas for MOT. Standards of ship construction,
especially while undertaking modifications, should be regulated in more detail for MIIT. IMO
conventions or at least the principles for maritime safety should be made compulsory in domestic
waters to avoid risks by MSA. Training for the crew of inland waterways should be strengthened in
parallel. Local governments should be stricter and carry out effective surveillance in the future. A
safety management system should be strictly followed, coupled with a tight assessment system by
the ship’s company.

For the case of the Sewol, the high level recommendations mainly focus on SAR and training due
to the greater number of human factors involved in this accident compared with the Eastern Star.

Detailed recommendations are listed in Tables 14 and 15.
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Table 14. Recommendations for Eastern Star

Catalogues
Enforcement gaps

Causes

Recommendations

Authorities did not notice the missing Authorities should be responsible and careful when making annual inspections and
closing devices required by reg.

should follow up on ships with higher potential safety risks.

Authorities did not notice the ballast water
modifications
Inadequate training for the captain and Companies should strengthen training for their captains and crew. Sufficient
crew

simulations are necessary for staff on board to master the knowledge to handle all
kinds of situations.
The authorities should organize some enforcement training programs and exams to
test the capabilities of the crew.

Company did not report the modification Ship companies should not hide anything related to safety for profit.
to authorities

Serious penalties should be instituted on the companies if any enforcement gaps

Company did not conduct effective are found.
tracking and monitoring of the ship
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Regulatory gaps

No dynamic monitoring ship survey Dynamic monitoring ship survey system should be applied to follow up the
system

conversions of ships.

GMDSS equipment not required by Regulations for ships navigating inland waterways should be stricter.
regulations

Technological standards should be improved to guarantee the safety performance
of domestic ships.

Authorities set operational limits at wind The navigation restriction when encountering adverse weather in Changjiang is
force BF 9

suggested to be adjusted as follows: (1) a ship can not sail and should take effective
measures to avoid strong winds when the wind force is forecasted over BF 7
(includingBF7) either at the departure port or the navigating routes. (2) When
visibility at the departure ports is less than 1000 meters, the ship is prohibited from
departing or leaving the port. When visibility during voyages is less than 1500
meters downstream or 1000 meters uplink, the anchor should be suspended.

Escape routes were narrow following an More stringent checks on ships should be made in the future.
earlier conversion
Management gaps

Authorities did not supervise and monitor Necessary system for training should be set by authorities both for training and
crew training

Company

assessment.

Automatic closing devices were not fitted Companies should improve the level of safety management and self-checks.
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negligence

to watertight doors

Authorities should regulate more strictly and make more inspections of the

Company manipulated ballast water tanks companies.
Ship was not well maintained
Furniture in the cabins is movable
Unsuitable

VTS operator was not following the The duties and equipment on VTS should be strengthened.

procedures

development

An effective and efficient emergency reporting system should be built to facilitate

Complicated procedure to alarm central the SAR.
SAR services
Market pressure

Keep navigating in bad weather to catch Profit pursuit should be balanced with safety management and safety should take
the tourist plan

the priority position.

Cut the ship maintenance cost for lower
ticket price
License

Authorities issue water transport permit More stringent procedures should be taken before issuing permits and regular
without careful survey

Training/

Unsuccessful

Qualification

maneuverability

attempts

audits should be made after issuance.
to

maintain Training for improved knowledge and skills on manoeuvring should be
strengthened.
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Table 15. Recommendations for Sewol

Catalogues
Enforcement gaps

Causes
Authorities did not notice overload

Recommendations
Thorough improvements should be carried out on the entire safety control

Authorities did not notice the falsified structure, proper measuring channel, such as feedback that reflects the
documents when registering

effectiveness of safety constraints need to be designed for continuous

Vehicles were not well fastened

improvement and corrective action (Kim, Nazir, & Øvergård, 2016).

Watertight door was lashed open
Regulatory gaps

Lower standards for the training of the The requirements for the captain and crew should be improved to an
captain and crew of domestic ships

international level. The captain and crew should master knowledge and skills to
cope with different situations. And they should know how to behave in an

Company

Inadequate training for the captain and crew

emergency.

negligence
Ship conversion causes the center of gravity The safety limits of the vessel should be based on the shipyard’s original design
to move upward

and the level of upgrading with respect to increased requirements or limits. A
thorough risk assessment should be routinely carried out to ensure safe working
practices. Continuous monitoring of risk and identifying potential areas of
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concern before they develop into hazards should be given priority. Constrain
hazards before they lead to accidents.
Rudder equipment malfunction

The ship’s command should desist from taking risks and give absolute priority

Captain was not in the bridge during to the safety of the vessel and passengers, which also includes the securing of
complicated situation

cargo and provision of a sufficiently intact lashing system in accordance with

No effective evacuation was organized by requirements to maintain ship stability.
captain
Unsuitable

Ship did not follow the route recommended Establish integrated and corporate safety information system to maintain

procedures

by authorities

accurate process (mental) models of all system controllers to assist in decision
making.

SAR was not organized in time

Coast guard was cancelled after the accident for the negligence and a more
scientific SAR was built in the Republic of Korea.

Training/

Unsuccessful

Qualification

maneuverability

attempts

to

maintain Crew of Ro-Ro passenger ships should be properly trained for accurate and
immediate actions during emergency, and should have clear instructions on

Large rudder angle made the ship list heavily maximizing their vessels’ chances of survival in cases of water ingress to the car
Captain and crew took wrong measures in deck. The training should address day-to-day shipboard operations, risk
emergency

assessment procedures as well as contingency planning and emergency
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VTS operator was not following the preparedness.
development
Market pressure

Serious cargo overload

Profit pursuit should be balanced with safety management and safety should
take the priority position. More stringent punishment regulations should be
carried out in the future.
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7.2 Conclusions
Despite the endeavours of international organizations, flag and port administrations and
classification societies in terms of promulgating regulations and requirements that make the
maritime industry safer overall, the responsibility for ensuring the safety of ships, crew and
passengers must initiate from the owners themselves. The reality calls for a cost-effective safety
management approach that balances safety with economy, efficiency, and performance constraints,
which do not cause the degradation of safety efforts over time.

After comparing several popular investigation methods, AcciMap was chosen as a harmonized
approach to be applied in identifying and analysing the causes of the Eastern Star and Sewol
accidents due to its advantages in organizational factor analysis and regarding recommendations to
be formulated. Factual information was collected and ordered for the drawing of an ActorMap and
AcciMap. ActorMaps were made to identify the actors involved in the accidents in order to prepare
the draft of the AcciMap. Based on the investigation reports and factual information, AcciMaps of
the Eastern Star and Sewol accidents were drafted separately. Relationships behind the root causes
described in these two diagrams were illustrated according to the six levels of AcciMap. The six
levels are listed as: topography and configuration of scenery and equipment, accidental flow of
events and acts, technical and operational management involved, company management and
local area planning, regulatory bodies and associations and government policy and legislation.
These levels combined with cataloguing the causes can develop relevant recommendations. At the
same time, a comparison of the two accidents was made from factual information and identified
failures based on the AcciMap. The comparison listed the causes in tables, making it easy to find
the similarities and differences in the two accidents. Further measures should be taken to prevent
the repetition of accidents on domestic ships.

This research made some progress in the application of AcciMap in two significant events and
provided some measures to prevent the repetition of similar tragedies in the future. However,
further research is welcome to be developed due to the constraints both in the approach itself and
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information collection. The cases of the capsizing of the Eastern Star and Sewol ferry surely still
have a lot of unsolved questions. This study provided some new insights to encourage further
discussion and research into the establishment of effective measures for national and international
maritime safety control and management.
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